



Bundesministerium
des Innern

Civil Defence Concept (KZV)

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List of abbreviations

ABC	atomic, biological and chemical
AMG	Medicinal Products Act
ApBetrO	Pharmacy Operating Regulations
B	biological
BBankG	Bundesbank Act
BBK	Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance
BBKG	Act establishing the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response
BfS	Federal Office for Radiation Protection
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
BMVg	Federal Ministry of Defence
BMVI	Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure
BMWi	Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
BSI	Federal Office for Information Security
C	chemical
CEP	civil emergency planning
CRM	crisis response measures
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
EBV	German National Petroleum Stockpiling Agency
EItSV	Electricity (Security of Supply) Ordinance
EnSiG	Energy (Security of Supply) Act
EnWG	Energy Industry Act
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
EVG	Preparedness (Food Supplies) Act
GasLastV	Ordinance on Gas Load Dispatching
GasSV	Natural Gas (Security of Supply in Crisis) Ordinance
IMK	Standing Conference of federal and state interior ministers
IT	information technology
KAEP	hospital response planning and hospital staffing planning
KAPIBw	Bundeswehr Crisis Response and Alert Plan
KdB	Bundeswehr Concept
KRITIS	critical infrastructure

KWG	Banking Act
KZV	Civil Defence Concept
MANV	mass casualties
mSv	millisievert
N	nuclear
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRS	NATO Crisis Response System
NDPP	NATO Defence Planning Process
PTSG	Emergency Preparedness (Post and Telecommunications) Act
R	radiological
RKI	Robert Koch Institute
RRGV	Framework Guidelines for Overall Defence
SGB	Social Code
SSK	Commission on Radiological Protection
StAN	crisis establishment and list of equipment and supplies
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
THW	Federal Agency for Technical Relief
THWG	Act on the Federal Agency for Technical Relief
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
VerkLG	Transport Services (Provision in Times of Natural Disaster and Economic Crisis) Act
VerkSiG	Emergency Preparedness (Transport) Act
WasSG	Emergency Preparedness (Water) Act
WiSiG	Emergency Preparedness (Industry, Commerce and Finance) Act
WiSiV	Emergency Preparedness (Industry, Commerce and Finance) Ordinance
ZAPRL	Guideline for Civil Alert Planning
ZSKG	Federal Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Act.
ZUB	Federal Support Group for Serious Nuclear Threats (BKA, BfS and Federal Police)

1 Background and objectives

The last time the federal ministries adopted a new joint strategy for civil defence was in 1995, in a climate of reduced security policy tensions following the end of the Cold War. Many federal civil defence structures and facilities were dismantled and replaced with (shared) use of the disaster management resources of the federal states (*Länder*).

Following the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the flooding in summer 2002, the Federation and the federal states agreed on a new strategy for civil protection at the standing conference of the federal and state interior ministers (IMK) in 2002. This strategy was intended to improve federal support for the states in preparing for and dealing with large-scale emergencies in peacetime. As a result, the focus at federal level shifted from the primary task of civil defence to the subsidiary task of administrative and disaster assistance pursuant to Article 35 of the Basic Law. At the time, no need was seen to update the conceptual foundations specific to the task of civil defence.

More than ten years later, the security policy environment has again changed. Focusing on support for the federal states no longer appears sufficient. All civil defence tasks require at least an updated conceptual foundation and implementation planning in the context of responsible security preparedness by all levels of government.

This Civil Defence Concept (KZV) provides the conceptual foundation for the federal ministries to carry out tasks in the field of civil defence and civilian emergency preparedness in a coordinated way. This document describes principles and connections and sets the parameters for individual specialized tasks to be specified later. It provides the basis for future efforts and planning by the federal ministries with an approach that consistently starts at the bottom and moves up or moves from the general to the specific.

It offers a framework for the necessary adaptation to a changing security environment and the resulting demands on federal civil defence and emergency preparedness. Capability-oriented guidelines for organizing civil defence and

acquiring the necessary equipment and supplies are intended to enable further development based on comparing the current situation with the desired result. These guidelines will be further specified and added to in later conceptual and strategic documents. That is why the present document is relatively brief and generally worded. It does not provide details or concrete numbers, which will be given in the conceptual and strategic documents mentioned above (framework, special, subject-specific and capability concepts).

This document represents the civilian counterpart to the Bundeswehr Concept (KdB). Together, these two documents are intended to serve as the basis for overhauling the Framework Guidelines for Overall Defence (RRGV).

2 Subject

2.1 Function and tasks of civil defence

Realizing that defending the federal territory against external attack and protecting the population are essential tasks of the state, the Federal Republic of Germany has given defence tasks constitutional status. A responsible policy of government preparedness cannot do without defence capability. This encompasses both military and civil defence as components of overall defence which are of equal rank and intended to achieve the same objective, yet are organizationally independent of each other. To strengthen the resilience of our country, the shared use of resources must be constantly improved.

Here, civil defence will continue to be provided in accordance with the applicable law as well as with existing obligations and powers under international and European law. Pursuant to Article 73 (1) no. 1 of the Basic Law, the Federation has exclusive legislative power with respect to defence, including protection of the civilian population. The Federal Ministry of Defence and the other line ministries plan and carry out specialized tasks in the field of overall defence on their own responsibility. The Federal Ministry of the Interior is directly responsible for civil protection tasks and for coordinating civil defence matters across ministries.

The federal states' specialized administrations carry out federal law in the field of civil defence, such as the Federal Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act (ZSKG), on behalf of the Federation unless the law, such as the Act on the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THWG), provides for federal administration.

Within this legal and organizational framework, the task of civil defence is to plan, prepare and carry out all civilian measures to establish and maintain defence capability, including protecting the public and ensuring the provision of vital services.

These measures include

- ensuring the continuity of state and government functions;
- protecting the public against threats that may arise during a state of defence (civil protection);
- providing the necessary goods and services for the public, state and government bodies, the armed forces, the organizations responsible for civil protection and the government agencies responsible for emergency preparedness;
- helping the armed forces establish and maintain their defence capability and freedom to operate.

To further reinforce the ability of society to function in crisis situations, robust structures connecting the ministries, different levels of government and operators of critical infrastructure should be put in place.

2.2 Federal tasks in emergency preparedness

The Basic Law gives the Federation (exclusive or concurrent) powers to pass legislation in certain areas concerning the provision of vital services:

- energy industry (Article 74 (1) no. 11 of the Basic Law);
- adequacy of the food supply (Article 74 (1) no. 17 of the Basic Law);
- transport services (Article 73 (1) nos. 6 and 6a, Article 74 (1) nos. 21, 22 and 23 of the Basic Law);
- postal and telecommunications services (Article 73 (1) no. 7 of the Basic Law).

In these areas, the Federation has the power to pass legislation on vital needs of the population in case of threats to or disruptions of provision, regardless of the cause.

The federal states are typically responsible for carrying out such legislation, for example the Preparedness (Food Supplies) Act (EVG).

The Federation also has the power to pass legislation governing measures to combat diseases which are communicable and pose a danger to the public (Article 74 (1) no. 19 of the Basic Law). The federal states are also responsible for carrying out this resulting legislation as a matter of their own concern.

2.3 Subsidiary federal tasks

The federal states are responsible for legislation and administration in the field of emergency preparedness and response in peacetime. If the Federation maintains its own resources for its civil defence and emergency preparedness tasks, it may provide the states with administrative and disaster assistance pursuant to Article 35 of the Basic Law within the federal territory, in a subsidiary role and within the existing structures. The Federation may also engage in international disaster relief on the basis of bilateral assistance agreements or within the framework of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism or of the UN's humanitarian aid in line with the principles of subsidiarity and voluntary participation. The principle of subsidiarity means that the Federation is not usually supposed to make its own provision for disaster relief.

3 Framework conditions

3.1 Security policy and conceptual framework

The transatlantic partnership in the NATO framework is one of the main foundations for German security and defence policy and thus for the security and defence of Germany and its allies. The aim of collective defence is to ensure or if necessary restore the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the alliance through deterrence and prevention of armed (or hybrid) attacks from outside the alliance. Collective defence is thus national defence in the broader sense.

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty may be invoked if one NATO member is attacked from outside the alliance. All other NATO members are then required to provide assistance. However, each member may decide for itself what form this assistance

will take. Appropriate preparation is the subject of the ongoing NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

Germany meets its binding voluntary obligations with its participation in the joint defence planning, including civil emergency planning (CEP). NATO's strategic and conceptual standards in this way also influence the national capability profile. The line ministries at every level incorporate the resulting planning guidelines into their own planning.

NATO members have agreed on the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) with predefined crisis response measures (CRM) to ensure a coordinated military and civilian crisis response. The member states are responsible for the national implementation and feasibility of these measures.

National military contingency planning is based on the Bundeswehr Crisis Response and Alert Plan (KAPIBw). This plan applies the NCRS and its alert measures to the Bundeswehr and adds its own national measures, enabling the Bundeswehr to respond appropriately to the given situation within the range of its national tasks. Alert measures of the Bundeswehr Crisis Response and Alert Plan can be triggered independently of NATO processes. The Federal Ministry of Defence is responsible for this document.

The Guideline for Civil Alert Planning (ZAPRL) summarizes the tasks to be performed during a state of tension or defence and which may be carried out to protect the civil population and ensure the provision of vital services. It governs the uniform drafting of alert documents by all participating agencies in the civil administration and the procedures for putting them on alert. The Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for this document. Because military and civil crisis prevention and response are mutually dependent, the Bundeswehr Crisis Response and Alert Plan and the Guideline for Civil Alert Planning should be coordinated with each other and should be applicable both during a state of tension or defence and when invoking Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.

In addition to NATO, the EU provides another key framework for formulating and implementing German security and defence policy. According to Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union, if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power. This may include civil and military support. The individual member states decide on the type and extent of assistance they provide. The solidarity clause in Article 222 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union similarly governs assistance in the event of a terrorist attack or disaster.

3.2 Risks and threats

The inseparability of military and civil defence requires a coordinated perception of threats and risks as a joint basis for planning. The Federal Ministry of Defence has primary responsibility for assessing military threats. Civil defence planning is based on this assessment.

This Civil Defence Concept therefore follows the Federal Government's threat assessment as described in its 2016 White Paper on security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr. The White Paper focuses on the altered security environment and the resulting challenges for national and alliance defence, especially on hybrid threats to national defence posed by state and non-state actors. It is the task of civil defence to position itself to prevent these new threats without neglecting its classic tasks in national and alliance defence. The growing vulnerability of modern infrastructure and the resource dependence of modern societies offer a variety of points of attack. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, conflicts involving terrorist means and attacks in cyberspace can become a direct threat to Germany and its allies. Overall, the interaction of internal and external security can be expected to increase further.

In line with the targets and means of attack described, the federal ministries concentrate their civil defence planning on the following threats:

- the use of conventional weapons;
- the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials (CBRN threats);
- the use of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems;

- cyber attacks;
- failure or disruption of critical infrastructure.

In the case of hybrid threats, the following special characteristics should be noted:

- a variety of overt and covert attacks;
- the combination of conventional and irregular forces/capabilities;
- the combination of military and civilian means;
- focus on vulnerable structures as targets of attack;
- unpredictability of potential damage scenarios;
- difficulties in identifying attacks and who is responsible for them;
- little if any advance warning.

3.3 Dealing with hybrid threats

In December 2015 the foreign ministers of the NATO member states approved a strategy on hybrid warfare. According to this strategy, the following basic capabilities in particular must be ensured:

- continuity of state and government functions;
- the supply of food and drinking water;
- the energy supply;
- telecommunications services;
- transport services;
- management of refugee flows and/or population movements;
- management of mass casualties.

In February 2016, the North Atlantic Council adopted the implementation plan for the strategy, and the defence ministers of the member states took note. Guidelines on Civil Preparedness are being drafted and are to be taken into account in national planning processes.

In parallel, the EU has initiated agreed measures on dealing with hybrid threats. On 6 April 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, called the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response (JOIN(2016) 18 final). This joint communication "aims

to facilitate a holistic approach that will enable the EU, in coordination with Member States, to specifically counter threats of a hybrid nature by creating synergies between all relevant instruments and fostering close cooperation between all relevant actors. The actions build on existing strategies and sectoral policies that contribute to achieving greater security", for example the European Agenda on Security, the European Union Global Strategy for foreign and security policy and the Energy Security Strategy. The proposed strategy concentrates on the following elements:

- improving awareness of hybrid threats,
- building resilience,
- preventing, responding to crisis and recovering,
- enhancing EU–NATO cooperation on countering hybrid threats.

The Council welcomed the joint communication on 19 April 2016 (Council Conclusions on Countering Hybrid Threats, Doc 7928/16) and recommended a review of the proposed measures. On 8 July 2016, ahead of the NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO and the EU signed a joint declaration intended to open a new chapter of more intensive cooperation, especially to counter hybrid threats.

Hybrid threats are characterized in particular by the intentional blurring of the distinction between war and peace through the use of conventional and asymmetrical means. Hybrid threats pose a special challenge for civil defence because it is often difficult to detect them and identify the responsible state actors. As long as a state of tension or defence is not formally declared or Article 5 of the NATO Treaty is not formally invoked, responsibility for threat prevention and response remains with the federal states. In this case, the Federation is limited to assisting the federal states, and various legal instruments do not apply. As a result, situations may arise in which the available legal framework reaches its limits.

3.4 Socio-political framework

Volunteering to protect one's fellow citizens has a long tradition in Germany. Public institutions and private organizations involved in civil protection and disaster management are deeply rooted in our society. The trained volunteers of the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), of volunteer fire services, volunteer units of local-level disaster management authorities and of the five major relief organizations

(Workers' Samaritan Federation Germany (ASB), German Life Saving Federation (DLRG), German Red Cross (DRK), Johanniter Emergency Service (JUH) and Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD)) are all regarded with respect by the public. Their engagement is a unique instrument of public participation, as they work voluntarily, without pay and with great commitment to provide vital services.

In view of demographic trends, however, over the long term the pool of available volunteers may shrink and the viability of the volunteer system may be at risk. This is why we should start preparing now to reduce the workload of this system by encouraging individual responsibility and improving the public's ability to manage in emergencies.

Fulfilling this responsibility properly requires awareness of the relevant risks and the possibilities and limits of what the state can provide, as well as the necessary capabilities for self-protection and self-help. This calls for comprehensive communication: The Federation and the federal states should pursue a proactive information strategy to prepare the public, the media, interest groups, experts, operators of critical infrastructure and policy-makers to deal with possible crises. Such a strategy should aim to inform these target groups of possible risks and threats, their possible impacts on the state and the population and of planned action to counter these threats, while encouraging them to prepare for possible crises.

An open social discourse is necessary to arrive at a basic consensus on the extent and limits of government prevention and preparedness measures.

4 Common principles

For the tasks of civil defence, the current situation is compared with the desired situation in order to define strategic security objectives and identify the starting point for further development. These security objectives are operationalized by defining areas of action and establishing the planning and preparation necessary to achieve them.

The type and intensity of action to be taken is based on its proportionality. If necessary, the priority of different measures is established with the help of a risk assessment.

The planning and preparations for civil defence should be based as far as possible on the planning and preparations for crisis management in peacetime. Duplicate structures should be avoided. On the other hand, enough redundancies should be built into the organization (for example, stand-alone means of communication) to cope with crises.

5 Continuity of state and government functions

In case of crisis or during a state of defence, law-making, governing, administration and the courts must continue to function. The state and federal authorities responsible for maintaining public security and order in peacetime must retain primary responsibility for these tasks during a state of tension or defence. To make sure this happens, authorities must implement their own risk and crisis management measures. The Basic Law deals with the general outlines of the special demands arising in the exceptional situation of a state of tension or defence.

In accordance with constitutional provisions covering emergencies (in particular Article 115a to 115l of the Basic Law), during a state of defence certain tasks and responsibilities of the federal states shift to the Federation; within the Federation, certain tasks and responsibilities are shifted to different bodies (the Federal Chancellor assumes the power of command over the armed forces) and new bodies may be formed, in particular the Joint Committee as a subsidiary legislative body. The structure of government bodies and authorities may therefore need organizational, staff-related and functional adjustments.

The Federation and the states plan and prepare to take coordinated and simultaneous civil defence measures in accordance with the Guideline for Civil Alert Planning in the current version. This Guideline should be updated and revised in line with the existing structures as needed.

As part of civilian situation reporting and communications, the participating authorities at the various levels of administration are responsible for producing and providing the information necessary for Federal Government decisions. They do so in accordance with the Guidelines for Civilian Situation Reporting and Communications in a Crisis or a State of Defence in the current version.

To ensure that the state bodies and administration take civil defence action appropriate to the situation, they pursue the following strategic security goals on their own responsibility:

- ensuring the organizational capacity to act,
- ensuring staff capacity to act,
- safeguarding communication,
- ensuring structural-technical operability,
- ensuring that staff have housing and protection.

Measures to safeguard communication and structural-technical operability, such as the provision of emergency power and information and communications technology, are essential in preparing for the failure of infrastructure necessary to continue working. The minimum standards of the Federal Office for Information Security are crucial for the IT security of the federal administration (Section 8 (1) of the Act to Enhance the Security of Federal Information Systems (BSI-Gesetz)). It is also necessary to check whether the technical infrastructure could be a target of attack and whether additional protection or redundant systems are needed. Occupational and fire safety measures should also be reviewed, along with guidelines on self-protection for government authorities.

Government bodies entrusted with functions of overall defence should be located where they will be able to continue their work with as little disruption as possible. This may require taking special structural and technical protective measures. If it is necessary to abandon the office, plans should be made in advance to move the authority elsewhere to a more protected location (back-up location).

The strategy for maintaining state and government functions during a state of tension or defence is coordinated at federal level. Based on this strategy, all government

bodies and administrations review their own plans to ensure their ability to function and take measures on their own responsibility.

6 Civil protection

6.1 Basic principles and strategic security objectives

The basis of civil protection is the capability of all to protect and help themselves (and each other) until qualified, usually state-organized, assistance arrives. The national emergency response system rests on the volunteer potential of the fire services, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, the volunteer units of local-level disaster management authorities and participating relief organizations (Workers' Samaritan Federation Germany, German Life Saving Federation, German Red Cross, Johanniter Emergency Service and Malteser Hilfsdienst) as well as any organizations participating pursuant to state laws on disaster management. Volunteering constitutes the backbone of the system, which is reinforced by professional, full-time staff.

In the field of civil protection, the Federation draws on state-level resources for general non-police threat prevention and disaster management. It adds its own civil protection resources as needed, thereby contributing to a joint system of threat prevention and emergency response (integrated emergency response system). In particular, the resources of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) reinforce those of the federal states. The Federation also makes additional equipment, supplies and training available.

Which additional equipment and supplies are needed will be determined on the basis of the necessary capabilities, to be specified in consultation with the federal states in individual framework strategies. These strategies will form the basis for a new, comprehensive federal strategy concerning supplemental civil protection equipment and supplies.

Supplemental equipment and supplies build on the federal states' own efforts and resources and are provided based on information concerning the federal states' disaster management capacities and possible threats relevant for civil protection. A survey conducted at regular intervals will be established to collect this information.

If the federal states receive supplemental equipment and supplies from the Federation, the federal states must ensure that these resources are ready to be put to their intended use even if they have been distributed to different locations within the state. Technical equipment and supplies should provide support and relief for local operational staff as far as possible.

As an alternative to central federal procurement and provision of civil protection equipment and supplies, provision may be made to allow federal states to procure the necessary items locally and be reimbursed by the Federation. At the same time, the federal states should have the possibility to participate in central federal procurement measures as needed.

The Federation offers supplemental civil protection training: courses for policy-makers and administrators, supervisors, expert staff and multipliers. To do so, the Federation relies on its own basic and advanced training institutions, such as the Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ), or funds local basic and advanced training courses.

In accordance with the state's obligation to protect life and physical integrity (Article 2 (2), first sentence of the Basic Law) and the obligation to provide vital services (Article 20 (1) of the Basic Law), federal civil protection pursues the following strategic security objectives:

- ensuring the survival of the population/of the individual, and
- maintaining the functionality of vital and defence-essential institutions and facilities.

Another strategic security objective is preserving the cultural identity of our society (see also Section 6.12).

These security objectives are operationalized by compiling a catalogue of areas of action and protection capabilities. This catalogue is regularly reviewed with the help of reference scenarios to ensure it is complete and up to date. The Federation will develop an additional catalogue of reference scenarios from which planning variables will be derived in order to make quantitative determinations.

If possible, the individual capabilities should be freely combinable or modular and able to be distributed over different locations or rapidly relocated. Individual capabilities should keep up with technological developments, with attention to research results.

The following capabilities should be available as needed:

- self-protection,
- warning,
- structural protection,
- fire protection,
- evacuation/redistribution,
- care,
- health protection,
- protection against the effects of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents (CBRN protection),
- technical assistance,
- facility protection,
- protection of cultural property.

6.2 Self-protection

The entire population should have basic skills and knowledge in the following areas:

- safe shelter in threat situations;
- what to do in case of CBRN incidents;
- self-sufficiency;
- first aid;
- fire-fighting.

These skills and knowledge are taught using appropriate information and training measures. The Federation supplements measures of the federal states as needed. To this end, the Federation will develop a framework strategy for self-protection in consultation with the states.

6.3 Warning systems

Upstream systems/processes for warning include

- identifying threats and special threat situations during a state of defence in cooperation with other participating authorities as well as EU and NATO civilian and military offices;
- assessing and deciding when to issue alerts.

Timely warnings are essential to be able to take appropriate measures to protect oneself as quickly as possible. So it is an essential task of the state to provide reliable, timely and if necessary nationwide public alerts while recommending appropriate action. The Federation has an extensive public alert system for this purpose. Alerts are transmitted quickly and securely from a central office to multipliers (such as radio, television, Internet and telecommunications providers, Deutsche Bahn), which then immediately broadcast them to the public. Alerts are also sounded using sirens and via everyday means of communication, such as mobile telephones. They should be transmitted via as many information channels as possible to reach as much of the population as possible. Existing state- and local-level multipliers and means of warning should be integrated and utilized as well. An official responsible for civil protection and disaster management should be able to set off all existing alert and information systems (multichannel system) in his or her area of responsibility.

Capabilities of warning systems include

- rapidly sending alerts and recommendations for action, and
- sounding the all-clear in a timely fashion.

The basic system should be regularly updated to keep up with advances in technology. The pool of participating multipliers should be enlarged as needed. The means used to send alerts should be expanded and modernized as needed.

Structures and procedures for issuing alerts should be regularly included in exercises (national, EU, NATO) in order to test and optimize them.

The federal public alert system is among the vital and defence-essential institutions. Its functionality should be ensured using technical and organizational redundancies analogous to the measures to ensure the continuity of state and government functions in Section 5.

Analogue technology (such as loudspeakers) is an appropriate way to provide redundancy for limited area coverage.

6.4 Structural protection

Existing structures are used to provide the public with physical shelter (cover) and protection against CBRN contamination in the framework of self-protection. The Federation recommends, subsidizes or requires measures to reinforce the physical fabric of residential buildings and workplaces. Providing communal shelters across the country is not feasible, however, and in the case of incidents which occur with little or no warning, such shelters are of very little use.

The Federation recommends, subsidizes or requires structural reinforcement (in particular to withstand extreme, highly dynamic forces such as explosions or the impact of weapons) and ventilation measures to counter CBRN threats also to ensure the functioning of vital and defence-essential institutions and the protection of cultural property.

6.5 Fire protection

Fire protection institutions and units participating in disaster management pursuant to state laws also provide fire protection in the context of civil protection. Such measures include

- fighting damaging fires, and
- bringing large quantities of water from great distances to extinguish fires.

In consultation with the federal states, the Federation is developing a framework strategy for fire protection in the context of civil protection; on this basis, it is

supplementing the preparations and capabilities of the federal states with additional equipment, supplies and training.

6.6 Evacuation

For large-scale evacuations, for example in case of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the federal states have approved a Framework Recommendation for planning and conducting evacuations, also for a larger region. They have also agreed to provide emergency accommodation for 1% of their residents (Resolution of the IMK of 11–12 December 2014). On this basis, they are planning and preparing large-scale evacuations.

Evacuation capabilities include

- routing traffic;
- providing transport and safeguarding the means of transport;
- evacuating persons in need of special care and special facilities, such as hospitals, prisons, psychiatric hospitals, homes for the elderly and those needing long-term care;
- relocating and registering evacuees, reuniting family members;
- maintaining security and order.

In consultation with the federal states, the Federation is developing a nationwide framework strategy for evacuation; on this basis, it is supplementing the preparations and capabilities of the federal states by providing additional equipment, supplies and training.

Accommodation for evacuees comes under the heading of follow-up care and is described in the following section. Medical services for evacuees come under the heading of health protection and are described in Section 6.8. This calls for coordinated planning.

6.7 Follow-up care

The federal states have follow-up care units in reserve for their disaster management. In the event of a large-scale emergency or threat situation, these units look after persons in need of care. Unlike medical units, they look after uninjured

persons or injured persons who have already been treated by the rescue and medical services.

Follow-up care capabilities include in particular:

- setting up and operating emergency shelters;
- setting up and operating food service facilities;
- providing basic care and referral to emergency administrative and mental health services;
- looking after persons in need of special care (such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, parents with small children, unaccompanied minors);
- registering evacuees, providing documentation and tracing services.

The federal states have agreed to provide emergency shelters for 1% of their residential population. In consultation with the federal states, the Federation is developing a framework strategy for follow-up care; on this basis, it is supplementing the preparations and capabilities of the federal states with additional equipment, supplies and training. Planning variables are based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios. The Federation is also developing a framework strategy for mental health services in crisis management.

6.8 Health protection

6.8.1 General information

The authorities responsible pursuant to state law plan supplementary health care measures for the public in the context of civil protection. The Federation supplements the states' measures in view of the special civil protection demands caused by mass casualties. To manage such mass-casualty incidents, the following capabilities in particular are needed:

- medical services (pre-clinical care);
- hospital response planning (clinical care);
- stockpiling of medical supplies (medicines and medical devices).

In consultation with the federal states, the Federation is developing a framework strategy for dealing with mass casualties; on this basis, it is supplementing the preparations and capabilities of the federal states with additional equipment, supplies

and training. In the process, the Federation should strive for nationwide harmonization of the interface between pre-clinical and clinical care as well as clinical management of a mass-casualty incident.

6.8.2 Medical service

For the purpose of disaster management, the federal states have medical units as a supplement to rescue services. In the event of a large-scale emergency or threat situation, these units look after persons who are sick or injured as a result. Persons who are not injured are looked after by follow-up care units.

The medical service provides pre-clinical care, which includes all measures to protect the health of sick or injured persons, from the place where they became sick or were injured until they are transferred to a medical facility. Its tasks include

- setting up and operating treatment stations;
- triage;
- patient transport;
- setting up and operating one or more patient holding areas;
- setting up and operating one or more emergency aid areas;
- providing emergency mental health care and referrals for further care;
- registering evacuees; providing documentation and tracing services.

The Federation supplements the medical services of the federal states with additional equipment, supplies and training, for example to set up an interoperable, nationally standardized medical unit. Planning variables are based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios.

6.8.3 Hospital response planning

The federal states ensure a sufficient supply of hospitals for the population. Pursuant to state law on hospitals, the individual facilities must also regularly prepare to receive a larger number of casualties in the event of peacetime disasters or emergencies. In the event of mass casualties, hospitals must be able to manage a large number of patients needing treatment. Hospital response planning should take the necessary organizational measures in consultation with the state health authority to ensure sufficient reception and treatment capabilities, also across state borders.

Such measures should go beyond the necessary resilience of operations needed to ensure the provision of care as described in Section 7.2.

Hospital response and operational planning includes in particular

- drawing up a risk assessment for the specific institution;
- making preparations to deal with identified risks;
- making organizational arrangements for alerts, operational command, triage, communications;
- training;
- exercises.

In consultation with the federal states, the Federation is developing a handbook on hospital response and operational planning as an aid for individual institutions, in order to promote uniform standards, efficiency and thorough implementation.

At the same time, the Federation is working with the states to determine how to establish the capability to collect at short notice (using questionnaires or the like) detailed situation-related hospital data for both pre-clinical and clinical stakeholders. These data include in particular

- hospital occupancy rates (for example, for specific days) broken down by departments;
- capabilities of critical hospital departments such as accident and emergency departments, operating rooms, intensive care units;
- specialized resources such as beds for severe burn victims;
- isolation wards.

The need for additional medical care facilities is reviewed using the federal catalogue of reference scenarios.

6.8.4 Stockpiling of medical supplies

The federal states take the necessary action to ensure they have enough medical supplies (medicines and medical devices) on hand to manage a mass-casualty incident in peacetime. The Federation supplements the states' stockpiles of medical supplies with packages of medical supplies for civil protection. The quantity,

distribution and contents of these federally supplied packages are based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios and regularly revised as needed. These packages should be appropriate for pre-clinical use if necessary.

6.9 CBRN protection

6.9.1 General information

The federal states take the necessary action to protect against CBRN threats in peacetime emergencies. The Federation supplements the states' measures in view of the special civil protection demands of CBRN protection.

To deal with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, the following capabilities are needed:

- CBRN detection;
- CBRN decontamination;
- personal protection;
- collective protection;
- CBRN hardening;
- CBRN health protection;
- emergency radiological protection (including emergency nuclear protection).

The framework strategy for CBRN (ABC) protection in the context of civil protection (version of 5 March 2014) should be followed and further details added by incorporating it into the nationally standardized strategies/operational tactics for each capability.

Even apart from civil protection situations, it is crucial that all government agencies with relevant tasks in the CBRN area are effectively linked to each other. This includes the authorities of non-police threat prevention responsible for CBRN protection and the police agencies responsible for managing CBRN threat situations: at federal level, for example, the Central Federal Support Group in Response to Serious Nuclear Threats (ZUB); the civilian agencies having CBRN-specific tasks, such as the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) and the Robert Koch Institute (RKI); and the Bundeswehr's special CBRN units, such as its ABC defence units and institutes with CBRN laboratories. Various expert forums at federal and

state level regularly discuss CBRN-related issues. In addition, an interministerial and inter-agency platform has been established at federal level to share information on extremely important security-related CBRN matters (CBRN Info-Plattform Bund). In the event of terrorist threats or other extremely important security-related matters, this platform ensures comprehensive sharing of information among all federal agencies involved in dealing with such situations.

In addition, thorough expert advising on CBRM prevention and response which is not based on private actors is necessary for the political and strategic level as well as the operational-tactical level.

6.9.2 CBRN detection

Capabilities needed for CBRN detection are

- rapid detection of contamination by ionizing radiation, biological agents and chemical substances;
- rapid localization of the threat and georeferenced situation display;
- rapid, unambiguous qualitative and quantitative identification of the precise threat (e.g. type of radiation, type of pathogen, definitive substance identification);
- national network of laboratories to detect agents with bioterrorism potential from environmental samples;
- standardized sample-taking for CBRN;
- management/network of geographically dispersed CBRN detection units;
- professional situation assessment.

Sufficient CBRN detection capabilities should be available quickly and within a short distance of high-risk sites, such as relevant industrial sites. The Federation supplements the actions taken at state and local level by providing additional civil protection equipment, supplies and training.

6.9.3 CBRN decontamination

Capabilities needed for CBRN detection are

- availability of appropriate means of decontamination;
- decontamination of responders in personal protection equipment;

- emergency decontamination of persons, decontamination of area surfaces, infrastructure and equipment.

Sufficient decontamination capabilities should be available quickly and within a short distance of high-risk sites, such as relevant industrial sites. The Federation supplements the actions taken at state and local level by providing additional civil protection equipment, supplies and training.

The capability of emergency decontamination is generally provided by the states' water supply units, such as fire service water tenders, with their own or federal equipment. Specific planning variables should be developed based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios.

The Federation provides the capability to decontaminate responders in personal protection equipment at least for those responders engaged in CBRN detection using federal equipment. If the equipment provided is not needed to decontaminate responders, it may be used to decontaminate injured persons who are able to walk.

For the emergency decontamination of persons, decontamination of area surfaces, infrastructure and equipment, specific planning variables should be developed based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios. Whether the Federation needs to supply decontaminants and disinfectants in addition to those of the states will be reviewed using the federal catalogue of reference scenarios.

6.9.4 Personal protection

When defining target groups for personal protection, a distinction should be made between CBRN responders, other responders and the public with different levels of protection needs.

Personal CBRN protection for CBRN responders enables them to operate in a contaminated area without endangering themselves. With this in mind, all CBRN responders should have personal protection equipment appropriate to their function, to enable them to work under CBRN conditions.

Personal protection for all other responders (police, relief workers, etc.) enables them to move in a contaminated area without significant danger to themselves. With this in mind, all other responders should have basic personal protection equipment and be appropriately trained in its use.

Such equipment and training is supplied by the Federation for all disaster management responders operating with federal equipment; such equipment and training is supplied by the state or local government for all responders operating with state or local equipment. Personal protection equipment must be readily available during operations. THW staff should be enabled to conduct operations in lightly contaminated areas.

Personal protection for the public enables them to move in a contaminated area without significant danger to themselves. This means providing appropriate protective equipment and the ability to use it. Whether the Federation should supply appropriate protective equipment (respiratory protection, protective clothing) for the public or whether self-protection recommendations should encourage individuals to supply their own (e.g. buying masks at a pharmacy) should be decided on the basis of the federal catalogue of reference scenarios.

6.9.5 Collective protection

The objective of CBRN collective protection is to prevent CBRN hazardous materials from entering facilities or operational equipment and from affecting them, so that no individual protection of the public or responders is necessary.

Existing structures are used for physical shelter (cover) and protection against CBRN contamination in the framework of self-protection. The Federation examines whether measures to harden the fabric of physical structures should be recommended, subsidized or required. This entails identifying the current level of protection in the federal states.

In addition, the federal catalogue of reference scenarios will be used to decide whether to provide CBRN collective protection in individual cases for operational

vehicles, equipment and supplies (such as mobile command centres), decontamination facilities or the transport of injured persons.

6.9.6 CBRN hardening

The main measures of CBRN hardening include

- protecting material and infrastructure/facilities against the effects of nuclear explosions;
- protecting surfaces (resilience against the effects of CBRN hazardous materials and decontaminants);
- designing and forming surfaces with the aim of reducing the extent of contamination and of making decontamination easier.

The type and extent of CBRN hardening necessary for equipment and supplies as well as vital and defence-essential facilities should be determined using the federal catalogue of reference scenarios.

6.9.7 Health-related CBRN protection

Measures to protect health to manage CBRN incidents build on general health-protection measures as described in Section 6.8, adding to them as needed to manage CBRN-specific hazards. With this in mind, the Federation supplements the preparations of the federal states in view of the special demands caused by the mass incidence of injured and sick persons in CBRN situations in a civil protection context.

Capabilities of health-related CBRN protection are the CBRN-specific aspects of the following capabilities

- medical services (pre-clinical care);
- hospital response planning (clinical care);
- stockpiling of medical supplies (medicines and medical devices)

to supplement conventional health protection.

In consultation with the federal states, the Federation is developing a framework strategy for dealing with mass casualties in CBRN situations; on this basis, it is supplementing the preparations and capabilities of the federal states with additional

equipment, supplies and training. In the process, the Federation should strive for nationwide harmonization of the interface between pre-clinical and clinical care.

The Robert Koch Institute has the task of developing strategies to prevent communicable diseases and to detect infections at an early stage and prevent them from spreading. In consultation with the responsible federal agencies, the Robert Koch Institute draws up guidelines, recommendations, factsheets and other information for experts to prevent and detect communicable diseases and keep them from spreading.

CBRN-specific requirements for the medical service are

- setting up and operating a patient holding area between a contaminated and uncontaminated area;
- setting up and operating a decontamination station for injured persons outside a hospital;
- decontaminating injured persons.

CBRN-specific requirements for hospital response planning include

- taking CBRN incidents into account in the risk assessment for the specific institution;
- cordoning off the hospital to avoid contamination;
- setting up a decontamination station;
- providing subject-specific basic and advanced training for staff;
- providing medical care for those affected by CBRN materials.

In the case of purely biological agents, no decontamination is necessary, but self-protection and hygiene measures to prevent the spread of contamination must be planned.

Relevant planning variables should be developed based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios.

CBRN-specific requirements for the stockpiling of medical supplies are

- appropriate reserves of antibiotics/antiviral drugs,

- appropriate reserves of antidotes,
- appropriate reserves of potassium iodide tablets,
- appropriate reserves of mechanical ventilators.

To prevent and manage biological hazards, the Federation and the federal states maintain reserves of the smallpox vaccine and antibiotics. Additional supplies of the smallpox vaccine are not needed for civil protection.

The Federation and federal states maintain reserves of potassium iodide tablets to distribute in case of accidents releasing radioactive iodine. There is no apparent need for additional supplies for civil protection.

The Federation supplements the federal states' reserves of medical supplies to manage CBRN incidents as needed for civil protection. Planning variables should be developed based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios and needs in the context of civil protection should be adjusted as appropriate.

6.9.8 Emergency radiological protection

Protection against the effects of ionizing radiation caused by a CBRN incident is a special aspect of CBRN protection. Nuclear incidents are considered a subgroup of radiological incidents. This kind of protection aims to prevent serious deterministic effects (direct damage to tissue and organs) and to limit the risks of stochastic effects (later effects due to damage to genetic material).

The federal states make preparations to manage peacetime accidents at nuclear power plants based on the plants' own contingency planning. Operators of nuclear facilities are required to have such planning in place and to inform the responsible authorities immediately in the event of an emergency as soon as the predefined conditions for an alert have been met. Detailed criteria have been defined for this purpose.

The federal states are responsible for threat prevention by their disaster management authorities. The Federation assists and advises the federal states, in

particular with the recommendations of the Commission on Radiological Protection (SSK), to ensure that uniform standards of task performance are met.

These recommendations include emergency reference levels and additional rules for carrying out certain standard measures (staying indoors, taking potassium iodide tablets, evacuation). The federal states make the necessary preparations. The Federation supplements the capabilities of the federal states with additional equipment and supplies as described in sections 6.9.1 to 6.9.6.

If air masses bearing radioactive material pass overhead ("radioactive cloud"), the federal states are responsible for taking samples and measurements to determine whether food and feed for human and animal consumption have been contaminated. The results are forwarded along with additional data on environmental radioactivity to the Integrated Measuring and Information System for monitoring.

The Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) provides the prepared data, in the form of maps and tables, to decision-makers and the public.

If an incident occurs, areas outside the zone where disaster management measures are necessary may also be affected to a lesser degree.

Security objectives are

- keeping the dose reference value below 100 mSv (effective dose) for individuals for the first year following the incident, taking into account the reduction achieved by all measures taken;
- reducing the dose to below the reference value as far as possible and reasonable when considering all aspects of the individual case.

Radiation protection legislation which will also contain provisions on emergency radiological protection is currently being drafted to implement Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionizing radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom.

6.10 Technical relief

The federal states take the necessary action to provide technical assistance in peacetime emergencies. Technical relief encompasses all operations not limited to the use of extinguishing media or to emergency medical services and which involve power generators, machines or technical expertise. Technical relief is usually the task of the fire services. The Federation supplements the capabilities of the federal states by making available its reserves and facilities for civil protection, in particular the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). Pursuant to the Act on the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, the THW provides technical relief nationwide and abroad. Section 1 (2) no. 3 of the Act underscores the THW's dual function by tasking the agency with providing technical relief for the threat prevention authorities on request in response to disaster, public emergencies and large-scale accidents.

The THW is the only federal agency which is allowed to operate at local, state and federal level in response to large-scale emergencies and crises regardless of their causes. These capabilities which thus supplement the reserves of the federal states encompass the following areas in particular:

- search and rescue,
- emergency service provision,
- emergency repair,
- support for operational command (IT and communications).

The crisis establishment and list of equipment and supplies (StAN) serves as the basis for the organization, equipment and training of THW operational units. A framework strategy is being developed as the basis for adapting the THW to changing needs in the medium term. This strategy is intended to

- strengthen the components for operations in Germany and abroad and adapt them to changing needs;
- make the THW more attractive to potential volunteers and full-time professionals;
- ensure that the THW is ready for the future.

To safeguard its own ability to function and maintain its operational readiness, the THW plans to increase its internal preparations for

- the availability and operational readiness of well-trained volunteers and of the necessary operational equipment and supplies;
- reserves of fuel and consumable stores;
- clearly defined work processes;
- reinforcing its facilities to be able to operate independently (in particular emergency power supply).

The THW has uniform operational tactics, organization, equipment and training nationwide. With its standardized, modular structure, the THW can respond to a wide variety of scenarios in large-scale emergencies no matter where they occur. It can also respond rapidly and flexibly to situations of all sizes.

The basic module is a technical unit with headquarters as command module and search and rescue units as universal components; specialized units are added as needed.

The THW's basic capabilities should remain available at local level everywhere in Germany. The necessary expert groups are oriented on the scenarios in the federal catalogue of reference scenarios. Their geographical distribution, equipment and training will be guided by the future framework strategy for the THW. On this basis, the THW's capability profile should be recalibrated to adjust the priority of the existing tasks of search and rescue, emergency repairs and the emergency provision of services as well as support for operational command (planning and organization).

The operational requirement that one-third of all basic units and expert groups should be able to deploy nationwide or to several main locations simultaneously within 24 hours will be retained. To meet this requirement, command and logistics need to be safeguarded along with the ability to function autonomously and (if necessary) the ability of operational staff to provide for themselves. The same number of relief staff should be available after about ten days.

The THW offers the following capabilities by combining individual basic components and expert groups to work together tactically. The equipment and capability profile of the individual tactical units should be revised to keep up with the latest technology.

6.10.1 Search and rescue

The search and rescue capability includes the following:

- locating and rescuing people and property;
- clearing and demolition;
- shoring up structures;
- stabilizing after damage;
- water rescue and recovery.

6.10.2 Emergency provision of services

Emergency provision of services includes

- power supply;
- provision of drinking water;
- lighting;
- emergency shelter and assembly areas, food service stations and care stations for responders and victims;
- logistical support stations for material repairs, food service and care;
- material transports, also via waterways.

6.10.3 Emergency repair

Emergency repair includes the following capabilities:

- power supply;
- drinking water, wastewater, water analysis, oil pollution clean-up;
- setting up and preparing building infrastructure;
- building bridges and roads, providing technical assistance on transport routes, clearing and demolition, setting up temporary bridges;
- setting up temporary information and communications systems;
- protecting infrastructure against flooding;
- lighting.

6.10.4 Support for operational command

Support for operational command includes the following capabilities:

- command, command support and coordination;
- expert advising, technical advising;
- setting up and operating (mobile) command centres;

- setting up and operating temporary IT and telecommunications systems;
- providing food and care for responders;
- servicing and repairing vehicles and equipment;
- transporting operational equipment and supplies.

6.11 Facility protection

As far as needed to ensure the functioning of vital and defence-essential facilities, such facilities must be protected by the police or Bundeswehr.

Planning facility protection requires first identifying and prioritizing the facilities that need protection. Military facilities and civilian facilities with military significance are identified and prioritized according to the rules of the Federal Ministry of Defence. To identify civilian facilities in need of protection, a procedure like the one used to identify critical infrastructures in the framework of the IT Security Act will be revised as needed and a process for setting priorities will be added; this procedure will be implemented in the course of updating the draft model of the guideline on identifying facilities in the version of 31 March 1999.

Protecting military facilities is usually the responsibility of the armed forces. Protecting civilian facilities is in principle the responsibility of the state police forces, also during a state of tension or defence. The armed forces may protect civilian facilities as far as necessary to fulfil the defence mission. The Federation and the federal states will define the principles for cooperation between the state police forces, the Federal Police and the armed forces in the field of facility protection in a new guideline on facility protection.

6.12 Protection of cultural property

Pursuant to the Hague Convention of 14 May 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, the federal states perform most of the tasks of protecting cultural property on behalf of the Federation. The following cultural property must be protected:

- immovable cultural property (architectural heritage, groups of buildings and archaeological sites);
- works of visual arts and crafts usually kept in museums;

- works of writers, thinkers, composers and scientists usually collected in libraries;
- documents and maps usually preserved in archives;
- places where movable cultural property is stored (museums, archives, libraries).

The international instruments of listing with UNESCO (applying for special protection under the Hague Convention or enhanced protection under its Second Protocol) or marking may be used to preserve original works. The states decide this at their own discretion.

The states also undertake structural and technical protection measures, emergency planning and other appropriate action (such as preparations for moving works or setting up safe storage spaces) on their own responsibility to protect this cultural property against damage and destruction.

In addition to taking measures to preserve original works, back-up copies are made in order to be able to reproduce individual works or the information they contain. The central federal and state measure is the federal microfilming of archival materials chosen according to nationally agreed selection criteria. Significant and unique works of writers, thinkers, composers and scientists should be included in the federal microfilming efforts, as should significant works of the visual arts (photographic copies). State-of-the-art filming technology, media and documentation should be used. All films are kept in stainless steel containers in long-term storage at the central storage facility of the Federal Republic of Germany. The central storage facility is subject to special protection.

7 Provision of goods and services

7.1 Basic principles and strategic security objectives

The provision of goods and services essentially encompasses preventing and managing the failure or disruption of such goods and services. Where additional needs arise in the area of medical care as the result of certain emergency situations, the resulting tasks are described in Section 6.

All emergency planning is based on the existing peacetime structures and crisis preparedness measures. These will be reinforced as far as necessary by specific supplementary measures for civil defence needs.

Ongoing protection of critical infrastructures is a basic prerequisite for emergency preparedness within the framework of civil defence. To ensure the strength of the entire system, the resilience of all its individual components is continually developed and increased.

Also in civil defence, this effort starts with measures taken by the operators of services. The operators' own measures are flanked by government measures and are pushed, supplemented or replaced as needed.

The public helps reduce the need for emergency services through its own preparedness measures within the framework of self-protection. Appropriate measures should be taken to instruct and enable the public to this end (awareness-raising, information, recommendations, incentives, obligations).

Emergency preparedness by the state ensures the emergency provision of services until the operators can resume services. The primary goal is the rapid resumption of services by operators. The Federation supplements the federal states' capabilities for emergency provision of services and emergency repairs as described in sections 6.10.2 to 6.10.3. The Federation also conducts basic and advanced training for emergency preparedness staff at federal, state and local level (for example at the Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ)).

In accordance with the state's obligation to protect life and physical integrity (Article 2 (2), first sentence of the Basic Law) and the obligation to provide vital services (Article 20 (1) of the Basic Law), by ensuring the provision of services for the public the Federation pursues the following strategic security objectives:

- ensuring that the population survives,
- providing a minimum level of vital services.

These security objectives are operationalized by dividing them into areas of action and defining the desired level of protection and the measures to be taken.

The following areas of action in particular are intended to meet basic vital needs:

- drinking water,
- food,
- medical treatment.

The following areas of action in particular are intended to provide a minimum level of vital services:

- postal and telecommunications services,
- data storage and processing,
- the supply of cash,
- waste disposal,
- wastewater disposal.

The following areas of action are horizontal tasks; in addition to providing public services, they also help with civil protection, the continuity of state and government functions and support for the armed forces:

- energy,
- mobility/transport,
- production and distribution of commercial goods (including repairs and refurbishment of all kinds),
- need for workers.

7.2 Common requirements for operators

Given the many possible causes for failures or disruptions, services should be structured so that the overall system can continue to operate and be repaired despite disruptions.

Every operator should take responsibility voluntarily and on their own initiative for an appropriate level of security. The state issues specific requirements to operators to improve the resilience and security of critical infrastructures as needed. The National Strategy to Protect Critical Infrastructure summarizes the aims and strategic

approach of federal policy in this area. Requirements for operators to draw up risk assessments and develop security measures as well as create and add to crisis management structures will be formulated in a framework strategy for risk and crisis management by the operators of critical infrastructures.

Necessary measures include

- organizational and staff capacity to act (risk and crisis management skills),
- structural hardening of buildings and networks,
- IT security safeguards for critical infrastructures, including mandatory reporting of significant incidents which could lead or have led to failure or disruption of functioning, at least to the standard of the IT Security Act, the Telecommunications Act, the Energy Industry Act and the Atomic Energy Act,
- reduced dependence (e.g., own emergency power supply).

Providers of services in all areas of action depend on energy providers. To reduce this dependence and the burden on state emergency preparedness in the area of energy, all operators must make their own preparations. Federal law requires operators to be able to supply their own energy needs temporarily in case of emergency. The Federation is also increasing its supplemental resources for the capabilities of emergency provision of services and emergency repairs by the THW (see sections 6.10.2 to 6.10.3).

Operators in various areas of action are also dependent on transport and logistics services from the mobility/transport area of action. So these operators need to make their own preparations (own vehicle pool, framework agreements with transport service providers, etc.). In case of shortages which cannot be remedied with means available on the free market, the state may secure transport services as part of its emergency preparedness: Transport companies may be required to provide the state with priority services pursuant to the Emergency Preparedness (Transport) Act (VerkSiG) and the Transport Services (Provision in Times of Natural Disaster and Economic Crisis) Act (VerkLG).

Operators should take appropriate measures to deal with any other dependencies. If this is not possible, needs that they cannot meet on their own should be reported as

early as possible to the responsible state emergency preparedness agencies so that the necessary instruments can be created (for example, safeguarding the drinking water supply in hospitals in the framework of the Emergency Preparedness (Water) Act).

7.3 Emergency drinking water supply

Operators of drinking water facilities ensure the piped supply of drinking water for the entire population. In regular operations and in case of limited provision (due to the failure of individual components of the system), at least 50 litres of water that meets the quality requirements set by the Drinking Water Ordinance must be supplied per person per day for an unlimited period of time. The system of water mains should be hardened accordingly and redundancies available (such as waterworks, storage capacities and connecting pipes).

Government emergency preparedness agencies secure in particular the minimum level of drinking water provision for the entire population for at least 14 days in accordance with the current versions of the Emergency Preparedness (Water) Act and the more detailed statutory instruments issued to implement the Act.

Minimum requirements for drinking water are

- 15 litres per person per day,
- 75 litres per bed and day in hospitals and care facilities,
- 150 litres per bed and day in intensive medical care facilities,
- 40 litres per livestock unit per day.

The water quality must not be harmful to health.

Emergency supplies are provided from stand-alone wells and springs in connection with mobile emergency provision of drinking water (water transports). High-capacity wells should be built or prepared in critical locations, especially in major cities and urban areas. Chlorine tablets will be used to disinfect the water. Mobile drinking water supplies will also be provided. The Federation will provide transport capacities to meet the minimum needs of the public. The type, extent and geographical distribution will be based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios. The Federation is revising the framework strategy for emergency drinking water provision.

Appropriate measures should be taken to require the public to keep enough drinking water on hand to meet their needs for five days, until individual government measures start: two litres of water per person, per day; the water quality must be safe for human consumption.

7.4 Emergency food supply

Food is usually supplied by a large number of food producers and sellers subject to no special minimum requirements. Food will be supplied by the commercial food industry via the free market for as long as possible.

If the Federal Government finds that the free market is no longer able to ensure the basic supply of food for the population, essential food for the population will be supplied by means of the orderly production and distribution of food through government management of food production and distribution. The Federal Government may limit rights of disposal and require delivery regarding the cultivation, processing, distribution and sale of food by issuing statutory instruments governing the food supply chain. The agencies responsible for enforcement should also be given temporary powers of intervention until such statutory instruments are issued. The legal basis for emergency provision of food by the state should be amended accordingly.

The Federation may maintain emergency food reserves to ensure the basic supply of food.

Lastly, appropriate state measures should be taken to strengthen self-protection by the population. The public is required to keep individual food reserves sufficient for ten days and thus assist with state measures through individual preparedness.

7.5 Medical services

7.5.1 Outpatient medical care

The associations of statutory health insurance physicians are responsible for ensuring the provision of outpatient medical care (sections 75 and 77 of the Social Code, Book V). They are responsible for

- the availability of the various groups of doctors in line with the ratios given in the planning guideline which applies to the statutory health insurance, and for
- the nationwide provision of emergency services (usually does not include emergency medical services provided by the rescue services).

If certain regions are underserved, appropriate action should be taken to improve medical services in these regions. Existing instruments, such as financial incentives, should be expanded as needed.

7.5.2 Inpatient (emergency) treatment

The federal states are responsible for ensuring public provision of hospitals. They fulfil this responsibility in the framework of their hospital legislation and planning with determinations on specific aspects of care and care assignments for individual hospitals.

According to the federal health reporting system, hospitals in principle have reserve capacity which can be used in case of a large-scale emergency. Whether this reserve capacity includes core areas (operating rooms, intensive care units) and whether the annual average reserve capacity remains steady is checked for the purposes of civil protection planning. Managing a sudden increase in the need for inpatient treatment capacity in certain crisis situations is the subject of hospital response planning in sections 6.8.2 and 6.9.6.

7.5.3 Medicines and medical devices

Medicines and medical devices are provided locally by a large number of pharmacies and wholesale distributors. Section 15 of the Pharmacy Operating Regulations (ApBetrO) requires pharmacy managers to keep sufficient reserves of those medicines and medical products available only at pharmacies which are needed to

ensure the orderly provision of the public at least to meet average needs for a week. The same applies to bandages, disposable syringes and cannulas, catheters, infusion kits and products to test blood sugar. Pharmacies are also required to keep reserves of specific medicines needed for medical emergencies. Section 30 of the Pharmacy Operating Regulations requires hospital pharmacies to keep sufficient reserves of necessary medicines and medical products available only at pharmacies which are needed to ensure the orderly provision of hospital patients at least to meet average needs for two weeks. According to Section 52b (2) and (3) of the Pharmaceutical Products Act (AMG), full-service wholesalers of pharmaceutical products must keep sufficient reserves of medicines to meet average needs for two weeks.

In principle, these obligations ensure the nationwide provision of medicines and medical products under normal conditions to meet average needs for two weeks. They do not cover a sudden increase in the need for specific medicines or medical products in certain crisis situations. Nor do they cover needs for more than two weeks. These are the subject of state measures to stockpile medical supplies described in sections 6.8.3 and 6.9.6.

Appropriate measures should be taken to require the public to keep enough supplies on hand for own use (first-aid kits, supply of medicines needed regularly).

7.6 Postal services and telecommunications, data storage and processing

In accordance with the Act Ensuring the Provision of Posts and Telecommunications Services (PTSG), providers of postal and telecommunications services must ensure the minimum provision of communications for the public and public administration in the following ways:

- delivery of mail weighing up to 1,000 grams, including formal service;
- delivery of packages weighing up to 10 kilograms;
- publicly accessible telephone services, data transfer services including Internet access, electronic mail, the provision and repair of connections and transmission lines for these services.

Those with service responsibility (constitutional organs, courts, threat prevention authorities, Bundeswehr units, etc.) have priority for these services to carry out their tasks.

The Bundesnetzagentur monitors compliance with the PTSG and enforces it as needed (Section 10 PTSG).

According to the draft ordinance of 3 May 2016 defining critical infrastructures pursuant to the Act to Enhance the Security of Federal Information Systems (BSIG), certain data storage and processing facilities (such as larger data centres offering public cloud services) are also to be considered critical infrastructures with regard to IT provision. As a result, such facilities must also meet minimum standards and report significant IT incidents in compliance with the BSIG.

7.7 Provision of cash

According to the Banking Act (KWG), individual credit institutions must carry out banking transactions and financial services in an orderly fashion. This includes paying out deposits. Credit institutions must make the necessary preparations to do so. Currently, each institution decides for itself which risks to consider critical and to what extent (see Section 25a (1), fourth and fifth sentences of the Banking Act). If a credit institution considers problems in providing cash for its customers to be a critical area, it must plan accordingly for emergencies and crises. According to Section 25a (2) of the Banking Act, this applies with the necessary adjustments to outsourced tasks, such as the stocking of cash machines by service providers. There is no obligation to have a contingency plan in case of a larger crisis in order to help maintain or restore cash transactions.

Pursuant to Section 3 of the Act on the Deutsche Bundesbank (BBankG), the Bundesbank oversees the proper transfer of payments in Germany. The Bundesbank is responsible for ensuring the availability of the necessary money and for receiving the money delivered at the counters of its 35 regional branches. To do so, the Bundesbank has reserves of cash in all denominations for its account holders (credit institutions, authorities, payment service providers, staff). There are also strategic cash reserves at the level of the euro system.

The Bundesbank has taken very extensive risk management measures and has its own crisis management and business continuity plans covering the provision of cash. These plans are aimed above all at ad-hoc measures in case of shorter crises (one to five days), thereby giving the bank enough lead time to deal with longer crises.

The Bundesbank is not able to provide enough cash for the population nationwide: The 35 Bundesbank branches are not nearly enough in comparison to the 50,000 cash machines and more than 30,000 bank branches, nor is there any way for individuals to draw money from them. Functioning logistical infrastructure outside the influence of the Bundesbank, but encompassing the credit institutions and cash machine service providers, is therefore essential for ensuring the orderly provision of cash for the public.

Cash is distributed to the public by credit institutions, which typically rely on cash machine service providers to transport cash. Increased automation (for example, automated safes in bank branches or cash machines) may affect the ability to withdraw cash in a crisis. It is therefore crucial to ensure IT availability and power supply for credit institutions and cash machine service providers. The requirements described in Section 7.2 apply.

With this in mind, all private stakeholders involved in the circulation of cash (banking industry and cash machine service providers) must be included in overall crisis preparedness, and they must be required to participate in a crisis strategy encompassing the totality of cash provision and receipt.

7.8 Waste disposal

To protect the public against the dangers of improper disposal of waste (illness, injury, fire, etc.), extensive legislation governs the organizational, technical and financial obligations and responsibilities regarding the handling and avoidance of waste, including the possibility of punishment under criminal law and law on public order.

The general requirements described in Section 7.2 apply to protect waste disposal against disruption or failure.

7.9 Wastewater disposal

The diversion and treatment of wastewater to prevent health threats is a government task in the framework of the provision of vital services; in the context of civil defence, it is a federal responsibility pursuant to Section 1 (4) of the Emergency Preparedness (Water) Act. For the purpose of orderly wastewater disposal, wastewater is regularly collected in and transported through the sewer system, treated in wastewater treatment plants and then channelled into bodies of water serving as recipients or returned to the groundwater by means of seepage, sprinkling or sprinkler irrigation. Steps in the process are water removal, transport, treatment and return.

Under normal operating conditions, water removal is based on the availability of the piped supply of drinking water. Water transport requires functioning drainage pipes and sewers, while treatment and return requires functioning treatment plants. The general requirements described in Section 7.2 apply to protect wastewater disposal against disruption or failure.

If the supply of water for removal is interrupted, lower-quality water (dishwater, rainwater) can be used instead (using dishwater or rainwater to flush toilets, etc.).

7.10 Energy supply

The energy area of action includes ensuring the provision of electricity, natural gas and oil.

The Federation and federal states are drafting an overall strategy for the emergency supply of power in order to ensure a minimum power supply for the public, to maintain the basic and core functions of state emergency preparedness and to help keep critical infrastructures up and running in the event of long-term and large-scale power outages.

Based on the Energy Industry Act (EnWG), the Energy (Security of Supply) Act (EnSiG) and the Natural Gas (Security of Supply in Crisis) Ordinance (GasSV), the

Emergency Plan (Gas) for the Federal Republic of Germany summarizes crisis management in case of crises concerning the supply of natural gas. The Emergency Preparedness (Industry, Commerce and Finance) Act (WiSiG) and the Ordinance on Gas Load Dispatching (GasLastV) govern the gas supply specifically for the purpose of defence and in particular to cover the needs of the civilian population.

7.10.1 Electricity and gas

Network operators are responsible for maintaining secure network operations in accordance with the Energy Industry Act. To prevent or mitigate a potential supply crisis, they may intervene in the feed-in of electricity/gas by producers and, of lower priority, in the consumption of electricity/gas. Pursuant to Section 16 (2) and Section 16a of the Energy Industry Act, operators of transmission systems and gas distribution networks have the option of adjusting gas feed-in, transports and supply, or demanding such adjustment. Transmission system operators must inform the Bundesnetzagentur if there is a risk that existing production will no longer suffice to cover the vital need for energy and network operators cannot overcome this risk on their own.

In case of production shortages, the Federal Government may determine by statutory instrument that the conditions for a crisis pursuant to the Energy Industry Act have been met. In this way, the Bundesnetzagentur, as federal load dispatcher on the basis of the Electricity (Security of Supply) Ordinance (EltSV), is assigned the task of issuing orders to cover the vital need for electricity, for example through shutdowns or priority supply for vital facilities. The Natural Gas (Security of Supply in Crisis) Ordinance (GasSV) contains similar regulations for the supply of natural gas. In the concrete event of civil defence, the Ordinance on Gas Load Dispatching (GasLastV) governs the gas supply on the basis of the WiSiG. In this case, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) acts as federal load dispatcher and the federal states as regional dispatchers. By state law, upper- and lower-level administrative agencies and local governments may be assigned the task of load dispatching as group, district and area load dispatchers. Load dispatchers may issue orders to businesses and consumers in order to remedy or prevent a threat to public gas provision or to mitigate the impact of supply disruptions.

Facilities needing special protection, such as hospitals, are usually equipped with emergency power generators to ensure their electricity supply for a limited time (24 hours) independently of public supply networks. This emergency power supply is largely limited to the intensive medical areas of hospitals, however, and is not enough to maintain the full extent of regular operations and other medical care. The need for additional preparedness measures is the subject of review in the hospital response and operational planning described in sections 6.8.2 and 6.9.6.

Appropriate measures should be taken to enable the public to get through short-term power outages. This entails preparation such as

- a supply of warm clothing and blankets,
- a supply of coal, briquettes or firewood for fireplaces/stoves,
- a supply of candles and flashlights (crank- or solar-powered) as well as replacement bulbs, batteries and matches,
- fully charged batteries in computers, mobile telephones and telephones,
- solar-powered battery rechargers,
- battery-powered radios,
- a supply of cash.

7.10.2 Oil

To ensure the full supply of oil for 90 days should all oil imports be cut off, the Petroleum Stockpiling Act created the German National Petroleum Stockpiling Agency (EBV) as a corporation under public law.

The EBV is required by law to maintain reserves of crude oil and petroleum products (gasoline products, diesel fuel, light heating oil and jet fuel) equivalent to 90 days of net imports. All companies that produce relevant products domestically or that import such products into Germany are compulsory members of the EBV and are required to contribute to its funding. The EBV's crisis reserves are stored at about 140 different locations.

In the event of a supply disruption, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy may issue a statutory instrument to release oil reserves to the market if the

market is unable to make up for the disruption quickly enough. This provides the oil industry with additional quantities of crude oil for processing or with petroleum products for further distribution using existing logistics.

The reserves may also be used for the emergency provision of services. For example, when releasing reserves the EBV may be required to supply certain recipients if necessary to ensure provision for the public or for public facilities.

In addition to releasing reserves of oil and petroleum products, rationing of petroleum products may be ordered on the basis of the EnSiG or, during a state of tension or defence, on the basis of the WiSiG.

7.11 Mobility/transport

Ensuring sufficient vital transport services is a horizontal, interministerial task to meet the obligation of the relevant responsible agencies to provide services or civil protection.

Transport services are mostly provided by private operators (transport companies). As a rule, they should be obligated to provide services also in case of crisis. In exceptional cases, transport companies may be required to provide certain services at the expense of other contractual obligations if the need for crucial transport services cannot otherwise be met in a timely fashion or with reasonable means. This is based on the current version of the Transport Services (Provision in Times of Natural Disaster and Economic Crisis) Act (VerkLG).

These obligations apply to transport companies in the fields of road, rail, and air transport as well as shipping on inland waterways and on the high seas. In each of these areas, designated agencies are authorized on request to notify transport companies of their obligation to provide specific transport services. The agencies authorized to issue requests are also determined by law. All superior federal agencies tasked with civil protection or the provision of services in the context of civil defence should be authorized to issue these requests as necessary. Appropriate additions should be reviewed.

For the purpose of preparation, regularly updated lists of vehicles subject to registration, broken down by type and size class and by state, city and county, are available in accordance with the regulation on collecting, storing and transferring vehicle and operator data and the notice for purposes of emergency planning (Erfassungsrichtlinie-Kraftfahrzeug of 5 April 1979, in the version of 1 October 2012).

Other measures to ensure the provision of transport services, such as traffic routing, priority rules, bans and restrictions on using certain streets or routes, loading and unloading by third parties, coordination of flights, and air space controls, will be prepared in accordance with the Emergency Preparedness (Transport) Act (VerkSiG) using appropriate statutory instruments.

To ensure that road traffic continues to function, the Federation may provide emergency bridges and special equipment as needed based on Section 9 of the Federal Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act (ZSKG). Needs are identified using the federal catalogue of reference scenarios. In addition, pursuant to Section 10a of the VerkSiG in conjunction with Section 8 of the Transport Services (Provision in Times of Natural Disaster and Economic Crisis) Act (VerkLG), structural measures are taken for the federal railways as needed in case of disruption to restore railway infrastructure and provide basic services. The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI) has emergency bridges, mobile signal towers and protected crisis coordination centres for this purpose.

7.12 Production and distribution of commercial goods

Ensuring the provision of commercial goods during a state of defence is based on

- the Emergency Preparedness (Industry, Commerce and Finance) Act (WiSiG) and
- the Emergency Preparedness (Industry, Commerce and Finance) Ordinance (WiSiV).

The Act governs the provision of commercial goods and services for the civilian population and the armed forces during a state of tension or defence.

The Act authorizes the Federal Government to issue statutory instruments to suspend market mechanisms if the market is unable to prevent or remedy threats to provision in a timely fashion or using reasonable means.

The authorization to issue statutory instruments refers to the production of commercial goods, their handling, processing, allocation, delivery, purchase and use. This includes the processing and commercial use of forest and timber industry products and of food and agricultural products as well as the allocation and purchase of these products for the purpose of processing or commercial use. The statutory instruments also apply to commercial means of production and to services performed by commercial companies for repairs and refurbishment of all kinds and for maintenance, production and alteration of physical structures and technical systems.

In 2004, the Ordinance specified the implementation of the Act in further detail. For example, commercial enterprises with business premises within the Ordinance's area of application may, for defence purposes, be obligated to fulfil contracts to deliver goods or services with priority over other, competing orders.

In order to ensure the provision of goods necessary for defence purposes, enterprises engaged in the business of delivering goods must immediately report to the responsible authority what stocks of managed goods they are directly entitled to dispose of.

Upon justified application, the responsible authority may issue vouchers to purchase managed goods to meet existing needs.

It is necessary to examine whether such legal measures should be taken also for certain crisis situations other than a state of tension or defence.

7.13 Need for workers

Meeting the need for workers during a state of tension or defence is a horizontal task to meet the obligation of the relevant responsible agencies to provide services or civil protection.

The fundamental right to choose one's occupation freely (Article 12 of the Basic Law) also applies during times of tension and a state of defence. By way of exception, the Emergency Preparedness (Manpower) Act provides for state authority to require persons to render service if for defence purposes, including civil protection, the necessary supply of labour cannot be ensured on a voluntary basis. Pursuant to this Act, during a state of tension or defence, the need for workers in vital and defence-essential areas must be met. The Act authorizes the Federal Employment Agency to

- limit the rights of parties to labour contracts to terminate employment relationships, and to
- obligate persons to enter employment.

Keeping workers from leaving employment is intended to reduce fluctuation in the labour market so that the relevant companies and offices can continue to perform their tasks properly with experienced staff. The rules on obligatory employment allow for men and women to be released from their present activity, whether in dependent employment or other occupational status, and be obligated to take up employment in vital and defence-essential areas. The obligation for men is bound among other things to the existence of compulsory military service. Unlike men, pursuant to Article 12a (4) of the Basic Law, women may only be obligated to serve in the civilian health service or in stationary military hospitals. It is necessary to examine whether these provisions are still appropriate.

It is also necessary in principle to examine whether such legal measures should be taken also for certain crisis situations other than a state of tension or defence.

8 Support for the armed forces

The civilian side helps the German and allied armed forces establish and maintain their defence readiness and capability. The armed forces define in advance their support needs which go beyond general service provision described in Section 7.

There is currently no concrete military planning for defence in the sense of national defence. The Bundeswehr performs its defence mission primarily in the framework of alliances. It is firmly integrated within NATO structures.

The Bundeswehr anticipates conventional attacks on federal territory primarily on its external borders. To be capable of conducting operations in this area, it must have forces and means which can be deployed at the borders or outside the federal territory after brief preparation. This requires sufficient support in securing transport capacities (air, land, sea).

The Bundeswehr also needs strong support from the military and civilian areas of organization to perform all its tasks. Support services must be provided for stationary, movable, partly movable and mobile Bundeswehr facilities and elements.

In addition to the services described in Section 7, special support needs exist in the following areas:

Communication: Appropriate measures should be made available to replace electronic communication in order to safeguard the necessary sharing of information for the purpose of command and coordinated action by the Bundeswehr.

Information/warning: Information about CBRN threats is distributed via the nationwide civil protection warning system.

Medical service: Medical service support for the Bundeswehr should be planned as part of the planning and preparation of the civilian medical service and in the framework of civilian–military cooperation.

Energy supply: To safeguard its basic operating capability and communications, the Bundeswehr also relies on the civilian (i.e. state) supply of energy; during a state of tension of defence, this may be at the expense of civil-society areas. The WiSiG provides for priority supply for the Bundeswehr.

Food: The armed forces only have limited reserves of provisions to conduct missions; this does not ensure a long-term food supply for Bundeswehr forces. Planning should take note of additional needs, to be met by the private food industry on the free market. If the free market is no longer able to supply these needs, they are to be

taken into account in the framework of the emergency provision of food as described in Section 7.4.

Transport: To have enough space in which to operate, the Bundeswehr relies on the following civilian support:

- cooperation in routing civilian and military road traffic,
- inclusion in federal and state evacuation planning,
- availability of civilian means of transport, services and facilities,
- provision of fuel.

Relevant support should be prepared in the framework of the VerkSiG and the VerKLG.

Postal services: The Emergency Preparedness (Post and Telecommunications) Act provides for the rapid and secure delivery of postal items of special significance for the Bundeswehr, such as draft notices and notifications of payment (due) in the event that compulsory military service is reintroduced.

Accommodation: Should the suspension of compulsory military service be lifted, the Bundeswehr will need support in organizing conscription and building accommodation infrastructure.

Refurbishment: Support from the federal states' building authorities for refurbishing military facilities and civilian facilities with military significance by the authority responsible for construction and refurbishment should be planned.

The existing instruments for support for the Bundeswehr, the structures of civilian–military cooperation and the interfaces with a large number of private service providers should be included in training and exercises.

9 Further development

9.1 Principles

The further development of civil defence is a process which requires a constant comparison between the security objectives and capability requirements given in this document (target objectives) and the analysis of existing capabilities (actual situation). The result of this comparison reveals the gaps in capability to be closed through targeted additions and further development of what currently exists on the basis of needs-based, joint planning by the Federation and the federal states.

This process is continually based on federal, state and local risk analyses and their evaluation. This process is also accompanied by developing realistic scenarios (reference scenarios) used to represent and review the complex interfaces and capabilities of the various civil defence actors in a results-oriented way.

The further development of civil defence is heavily influenced by the following fundamental requirements:

- When (further) developing individual capabilities, a high level of interoperability with other individual capabilities and with the capabilities of other actors in the national security architecture (police, Bundeswehr, etc.) should be sought within the bounds of the Basic Law. Institutionalized national and international structures should be used to conduct the necessary coordination processes.
- Highly mobile operational elements, appropriate distribution and a compatible crisis management/command system should ensure rapid, nationwide availability of highly specialized capabilities.
- All organizational and material developments should fulfil the principles of resource and environmental conservation as far as possible.
- This document provides the foundation for the objectives and design of research and development projects in the field of civil defence.

9.2 Reference documents and next steps

The requirements in this document will become binding when the necessary legal basis is created and existing legislation is amended as needed. This includes above all

- the Federal Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Act (ZSKG),
- the Act establishing the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (BBKG),
- the Act on the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THWG),
- emergency preparedness and security of supply legislation and implementing regulations,
- the Framework Guidelines for Overall Defence (RRGV),
- the Civil Alert Plan,
- the Guidelines for Civilian Situation Reporting and Communications in a Crisis or a State of Defence, and
- the Guideline on Identifying and Protecting Facilities.

The following documents will further specify the requirements in this document:

- the federal catalogue of reference scenarios,
- the strategy for maintaining state and government functions during a state of tension or defence,
- the federal strategy concerning supplemental civil protection equipment and supplies,
- the framework strategy for self-protection,
- the framework strategy for structural civil protection,
- the framework strategy for fire protection in the context of civil protection,
- the framework strategy for evacuation,
- the framework strategy for follow-up care,
- the framework strategy for mental health services in crisis management,
- the framework strategy for dealing with mass casualties,
- the handbook on hospital response and operational planning,
- the framework strategy for CBRN (ABC) protection in the context of civil protection,
- the framework strategy for dealing with mass casualties in CBRN situations,
- the framework strategy on the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW),
- the crisis establishment and list of equipment and supplies for the THW (StAN),
- the framework strategy for the protection of cultural property,
- the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures,

- the framework strategy for risk and crisis management by the operators of critical infrastructures,
- the overall strategy for the emergency supply of power,
- Emergency Plan (Gas) for the Federal Republic of Germany
- the framework strategy for the emergency provision of drinking water,
- the framework strategy on training.

The following efforts are also planned:

- developing the foundation for sector-specific planning based on the federal catalogue of reference scenarios,
- establishing a standardized survey on state- and local-level capabilities and potential threats relevant for civil protection,
- reviewing the need for personal CBRN protection equipment for the public,
- reviewing the need for collective CBRN protection.

10 Summary

General information

- Civil defence planning is based on the Federal Government's threat assessment as described in its 2016 White Paper on security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr.
- According to current assessments, the main forms of conflict anticipated are hybrid conflicts, i.e. conflicts involving both state and non-state actors and enemies using both symmetric and asymmetric means. In view of the existing capacities and current arms purchasing, conventional attacks are also still possible in principle. The growing vulnerability of modern infrastructure and the resource dependence of modern societies offer varied points of attack.
- The strategic and conceptual standards of NATO's civil defence planning must be followed in the national capability profile in order to fulfil the duty to render assistance pursuant to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.
- In the EU context, the obligation of aid and assistance in the event of armed aggression in accordance with Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union and the obligation of solidarity in the event of terrorist attack or disaster in accordance with Article 222 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union must be met.
- The planning and preparations for civil defence should be based as far as possible on the planning and preparations for crisis management in peacetime. Duplicate structures should be avoided.
- The task of civil defence is to plan, prepare and carry out all civilian measures to establish and maintain defence capability, including protecting the public and ensuring the provision of vital services.
- Civil defence tasks include

1. ensuring that the state and government continue to function;
2. protecting the public against threats that may arise during a state of defence (civil protection);
3. providing the necessary goods and services for the public, state and government bodies, the armed forces, the organizations responsible for civil protection and the government agencies responsible for emergency preparedness;
4. helping the armed forces establish and maintain their defence capability and freedom to operate.

Ensuring the continuity of state and government functions

- The organizational, technical and personnel measures of the government authorities should be reviewed and optimized on the basis of a strategy to ensure the continuity of state and government functions during a state of tension or defence. All levels should create contingency plans based on the revised guidelines for civil emergency planning and the guidelines for civilian situation reporting and communications in order to ensure that the Federation and federal states are able to function during a state of tension or defence.

Volunteer and professional first responders and the public working together to ensure civil protection

- In the field of civil protection, the Federation draws on state-level resources for general non-police threat prevention and disaster management and adds its own civil protection resources as needed (integrated emergency response system).
- Which additional equipment and supplies are needed should be determined on the basis of the necessary capabilities, which should be specified in consultation with the federal states in individual framework strategies. These strategies should form the basis for a new, comprehensive federal strategy concerning supplemental civil protection equipment and supplies.
- Supplemental equipment and supplies build on the federal states' own efforts and resources and are provided based on information concerning the federal

states' disaster management capacities and possible threats relevant for civil protection. A survey conducted at regular intervals will be established to collect this information.

- If the federal states receive supplemental equipment and supplies from the Federation, the federal states must ensure that these resources are ready to be put to their intended use even if they have been distributed to different locations within the state. Technical equipment and supplies should provide relief for local operational staff as far as possible.
- The procedures for procuring supplemental equipment and supplies should be made more flexible. As an alternative to central federal procurement and provision of civil protection equipment and supplies, provision may be made to allow federal states to procure the necessary items locally and be reimbursed by the Federation. At the same time, the federal states should have the possibility to participate in central federal procurement measures as needed.
- The Federation will develop and regularly update a catalogue of reference scenarios. This catalogue will be used to identify capabilities and planning variables to calculate the resources (equipment and supplies) needed for civil protection purposes.
- The Federation will draw up framework strategies concerning the necessary capabilities in consultation with the federal states. Supplemental equipment, supplies and training will be provided on the basis of these framework strategies.
- Individual capabilities should keep up with technological developments, with attention to research results.
- The basic capability of civil protection is the capability of all to protect and help themselves (and each other) until qualified, usually state-organized, assistance arrives. Properly fulfilling this responsibility requires awareness of

the relevant risks and the possibilities and limits of what the state can provide, as well as the necessary capabilities for self-protection and self-help.

- An open social discourse is needed to achieve a basic consensus on the extent and limits of government prevention and preparedness. This includes the decision to bear certain risks and to live with the consequences.
- State-organized assistance in civil protection and disaster management rests on the volunteer aid potential of the fire services, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), cooperating relief organizations and the autonomous disaster control units of trained volunteers commanded by the chief executive official. Professional staff reinforce the system.
- The THW's capability profile should be recalibrated to adjust the priority of the existing tasks of search and rescue, emergency repairs and the emergency provision of services as well as support for operational command (planning and organization).

Operators, the state and the public working together to ensure the provision of vital services

- Ongoing protection of critical infrastructures is a basic prerequisite for emergency preparedness within the framework of civil defence. To ensure the strength of the entire system, the resilience of all its individual components is continually developed and increased.
- Every operator should take responsibility voluntarily and on their own initiative for an appropriate level of security. The state issues specific requirements to operators for improving the resilience and security of critical infrastructures as needed.
- Emergency preparedness by the state should ensure the emergency provision of services until the operators can resume services. The primary goal is the rapid resumption of services by operators. To this end, the Federation adds its

capabilities for the emergency provision of services and emergency repair to those of the federal states.

- The public helps reduce the need for emergency services through its own preparedness within the framework of self-protection. Appropriate measures should be taken to instruct and enable the public to this end.

Support for the armed forces

- The civilian side helps the German and allied armed forces establish and maintain their defence readiness and capability. The armed forces define in advance their support needs which go beyond general service provision.

Further development

- The further development of civil defence is a process which requires a constant comparison between the security objectives and capability requirements given in this document (target objectives) and the analysis of existing capabilities (actual situation).
- The requirements in this document will become binding when the necessary legal basis is created and existing legislation (including the Federal Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act (ZSKG), the Framework Guidelines for Overall Defence (RRGV) and emergency preparedness legislation) is amended as needed.